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Intraday Liquidity 
Management: 
A Tale of Games Banks Play
1. Introduction
“[Banks] like to hang on to their cash and deliver it 
as late as possible at the end of the working day.” 
“The Long Shadow of Herstatt,” The Economist,
April 14, 2001
The value and volume of interbank payments increased 
dramatically throughout the 1980s and 1990s as a result of rapid 
financial innovation and the integration and globalization of 
financial markets. In the United States, settlement of interbank 
payments grew from $300 trillion in 1985, or forty-five times 
GDP, to almost $500 trillion in 1995, or seventy-five times GDP 
(Bech, Preisig, and Soramäki 2008). 
Historically, interbank payments have been settled via 
deferred (end-of-day) netting systems. As the volume and 
value of transactions increased, however, central banks became 
worried about settlement risks inherent in netting systems. In 
particular, the banks were concerned about the potential for 
contagion, or “knock-on,” effects attributable to the 
unwinding of net positions that would result if a participant 
failed to meet its end-of-day obligations. Consequently, over 
the last couple of decades, many countries have chosen to 
modify the settlement procedures employed by their interbank 
payments system. 
Most central banks opted for the implementation of a real-
time gross settlement (RTGS) system. By 1985, three central 
Morten L. Bech is a senior economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
<morten.bech@ny.frb.org>
The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the 
position of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or the Federal Reserve 
System.
• To ensure smooth operation of real-time 
gross settlement systems, central banks 
extend intraday credit, either against 
collateral or for a fee.
￿ As intraday credit is costly—either explicitly 
as fees or implicitly as the opportunity cost 
of collateral—participating banks seek to 
minimize their use of liquidity by timing the 
release of payments.
￿ A game-theoretical study of intraday liquidity 
management behavior shows how the 
strategic incentives of banks depend on the 
intraday credit policy of central banks.
￿ Two classic games emerge: “the prisoner’s 
dilemma” and “the stag hunt.”
￿ The prisoner’s dilemma arises in a 
collateralized credit scenario, where banks 
delay payments even though they would be 
better off if they all sent payments early; the 
stag hunt arises in a priced credit scenario, 
where banks seek to coordinate the timing 
of their payments to avoid overdraft fees.
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banks had implemented RTGS systems. A decade later, that 
number had increased to sixteen, and at the end of 2006 the use 
of RTGS systems had diffused to ninety-three central banks 
(Bech and Hobijn 2007).
RTGS systems eliminate the settlement risk from unwinding 
because payments are settled irrevocably, and with finality, on 
an individual gross basis and in real time. However, the 
elimination of settlement risk comes at the cost of an increased 
need for liquidity to smooth nonsynchronized payment flows.1 
Thus, central banks typically provide intraday credit. 
Two types of intraday credit policies have emerged among 
central banks: collateralized credit and priced credit (Furfine 
and Stehm 1998). Collateralized credit, in one form or another, 
is the prevailing option in Europe and elsewhere outside the 
United States. Collateralized credit usually takes the form of 
pledging collateral to the central bank or entering into an 
intraday repurchase agreement with the central bank. Priced 
credit is the policy of choice in the United States. The Federal 
Reserve has been charging a fee for intraday overdrafts since 
1994. Quantitative limits, or “caps,” are used in combination 
with both types of credit extensions. 
Intraday credit is costly, whether explicitly in the form of a fee 
or implicitly as the opportunity cost of the pledged collateral. 
Consequently, banks try to economize on their use of liquidity 
throughout the day by carefully scheduling the settlement of 
payment requests received from customers and the banks’ own 
proprietary operations. Intraday liquidity management has 
become an important competitive parameter in commercial 
banking and a policy concern of central banks (see, for example, 
Greenspan [1996] and Berger, Hancock, and Marquardt [1996]). 
This article develops a stylized game-theoretical model to 
analyze banks’ intraday liquidity management behavior in an 
RTGS environment. It analyzes the strategic incentives under 
1 In most RTGS systems, payments are settled using reserve account balances 
at the central bank. For an individual bank, there are basically four different 
sources of liquidity to fund outgoing payments: 1) overnight reserve balances, 
2) intraday credit extensions by the central bank, 3) borrowing from other 
banks via the interbank money market, and 4) incoming payments from other 
banks. The first two sources affect the aggregate level of liquidity available in the 
system, while the latter two redistribute the liquidity among banks. Moreover, 
liquidity from the first three sources generally comes at a price, whereas liquidity 
from incoming payments is free from the perspective of the receiver.
different intraday credit policy regimes employed by central 
banks. We characterize how the Nash equilibria depend on 
the underlying cost parameters, and discuss the efficiency 
implications of the different outcomes. As it turns out, two 
classic paradigms in game theory emerge from the analysis: the 
“prisoner’s dilemma” and the “stag hunt.” Hence, many policy 
questions can be understood in terms of well-known conflicts 
and dilemmas in economics. This study uses the framework to 
conduct a comparative analysis of the relative desirability of 
different intraday credit regimes from the perspective of a 
benevolent central bank. In addition, it discusses in turn how 
several extensions of the model will affect the results. These 
extensions include settlement risk, incomplete information, 
heterogeneity, repeated play, multitudes of players, and more 
than just two actions. We conclude with general observations 
on the future of intraday liquidity management.
2. Intraday Liquidity Management 
Game
Envision an economy with two identical banks using an RTGS 
system operated by the central bank to settle interbank claims.2 
Bank A and Bank B seek to minimize the cost of making their 
payments. We look at one business day that consists of two 
periods: morning and afternoon. 
At dawn, both banks receive a request from a customer to 
pay $1 to a customer of the other bank on the same business 
day.3 Assume for simplicity that the banks can either process 
the request right away, or postpone it until the afternoon 
period. We abstract from reserve requirements and 
precautionary motives for banks to hold balances with the 
central bank, and thus each bank has a zero balance on its 
settlement account at dawn. Banks cannot send payments from 
their accounts in amounts that exceed their account balances. 
However, banks can borrow funds from the central bank. The 
cost of borrowing and how it is assessed depend on the intraday 
credit policy of the central bank. Here, overdrafts are assessed 
at noon and at the end of the day. Overnight overdrafts are 
penalized at a very high rate, making banks avoid them 
altogether.
If there were no adverse consequences, each bank would 
prefer to postpone making its payment and use the funds 
received via incoming payments from the other bank to 
provide the balances to cover its own outgoing payments. 
2 In many countries, the interbank payments systems are neither owned nor 
operated by the central bank, but rather by a private company or a consortium 
of banks. However, payments are usually settled in liabilities on the central 
bank. For ease of exposition, we ignore these differences here.
3 The customer could be internal to the bank, in which case the decision-
making agent can be thought of as the payment manager of the bank.
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However, postponing is also costly, as customers might either 
demand compensation for late settlement or take their business 
elsewhere in the future, thereby imposing a reputation cost on 
the delaying bank.
 For many payments, the cost of intraday delay is 
presumably small, as the underlying contractual obligation of 
the customer only specifies payment on a given business day. 
However, for an increasing number of financial transactions, 
the underlying contract stipulates payment prior to some 
specific time on a given business day, and the cost of delay 
could conceivably be high. Here, we simply assume the cost of 
delay to be a positive number D per dollar per period within.4 
Moreover, postponing payments until the next day is extremely 
expensive in terms of reputation effects or direct compensation 
to customers, so banks always submit any remaining payments 
in the afternoon.
A convenient way of arranging the possible actions of the 
banks and the associated costs is a 2 x 2 game, as shown in 
Game 1. Each bank can play one of two strategies: morning or 
afternoon. The first element in each cell denotes the settlement 
cost of Bank A, whereas the second element denotes that of 
Bank B. Following Bech and Garratt (2003), we label this game 
the intraday liquidity management game. 
In the next three sections, we explore the games that emerge 
under different intraday credit regimes. Our solution concept 
is Nash equilibrium—that is, a set of strategies for which 
neither bank would wish to change its strategy on the 
assumption that the other bank will not change its strategy 
either. We focus on Nash equilibria in pure strategies—that is, 
strategies where a player chooses to take one action with 
probability 1—which is in contrast to a mixed strategy, where 
individual players choose a probability distribution over 
several actions. We evaluate the efficiency of different 
4 Delay has several private and social costs associated with it. First, time is 
money (even intraday) and hence delay of settlement may displease customers 
and counterparties, which are left with higher costs and greater uncertainty. 
Second, delayed settlement increases operational risk insofar as the time span 
during which an incident may disrupt the settlement process increases and the 
time to recover after an incident decreases. Third, the process of delaying can 
be costly, and the resources devoted to managing intraday positions are a cost. 
Fourth, delay increases the length of time participants may be faced with credit 
risk exposures vis-à-vis each other.
outcomes by comparing both individual and aggregate 
settlement costs. The regimes are free, collateralized, or priced 
intraday credit. 
3. Free Intraday Credit Regime
The first adopters of RTGS systems provided intraday credit 
for free, and we use this intraday credit policy regime as a 
benchmark. With free credit within the day, there is no 
incentive to postpone payments. The free intraday credit game 
is shown in Game 2.
It is best for both banks to play the morning strategy because 
they incur no costs. Conversely, they incur the cost of delay if 
they postpone to the afternoon. The morning strategy 
dominates the afternoon strategy, and the strategy profile 
(morning, morning) is said to be an equilibrium in dominating 
strategies. A pair of dominating strategies is a unique Nash 
equilibrium. 
In Game 2 and in other games, we adopt the convention of 
underlining the cost associated with the strategy that is the best 
response of a bank given the strategy played by the other. We 
summarize the results of the free intraday credit game in Result 1:
Result 1: Early settlement (morning, morning) is a unique 
equilibrium in the free intraday credit game. The outcome is 
efficient in that it ensures the lowest possible aggregate 
settlement cost across all pairs of strategies. 
In reality, payment flows are not perfectly symmetric as they 
are in the model, and imbalances frequently occur. Moreover, 
the zero price for intraday credit creates no incentives to 
economize on overdrafts.5 In fact, the size of the overdrafts 
generated by banks (relative to their capital base) in an RTGS 
environment came as a surprise to many central banks. As 
guarantor of the finality of payments, the central bank is 
exposed to credit risk—as, ultimately, are taxpayers. Hence, 
central banks are almost unanimous in the opinion that the 
provision of free intraday liquidity is not a viable option.6
Game 1




morning cA(m,m), cB(m,m) cA(m,a), cB(a,m)
afternoon cA(a,m), cB(m,a) cA(a,a), cB(a,a)
Game 2




morning 0, 0 0, D
afternoon D, 0 D, D
Note: We underline the cost associated with the strategy that is the best 
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4. Collateralized Intraday Credit 
Regime
In most countries, central banks provide commercial banks 
with intraday credit against collateral. The practical 
implementation varies across countries, depending on the 
institutional infrastructure for the safekeeping and settlement 
of securities. For ease of exposition, we assume that credit is 
extended via intraday repurchase agreements (repos), as in 
the United Kingdom and Switzerland. 
Under the intraday repo agreement, the central bank 
provides the bank with $1 in its account at the beginning of the 
period in return for eligible collateral worth the same amount 
plus a “haircut” to cover any market and credit risk associated 
with the collateral. At the end of the period, the transaction 
is reversed. The central bank does not charge explicit interest 
for this service, but the collateral subject to repo entails an 
opportunity cost for the banks, as this collateral cannot be used 
for other purposes. The opportunity cost of collateral is 
assumed to be C per period per dollar.
If Bank A and Bank B both decide to process their requests 
early, then they each have to engage in an intraday repo with 
the central bank in order to obtain liquidity, and consequently 
they will each incur the cost C. However, if, say, Bank A decides 
to delay while Bank B decides to process, then Bank A will incur 
the cost of delay D in the morning period. However, in the 
afternoon period, it can use the incoming liquidity from Bank 
B to fund its own outgoing payment in the next period. 
Conversely, Bank B receives no liquidity and has to roll over the 
repo with the central bank for an additional period and incur 
the cost C one more time for a total of 2C. Finally, if both banks 
choose to postpone, they both incur the cost of delay D. 
Moreover, at noon they still have no liquidity available, and 
both have to engage in an intraday repo in the afternoon period 
for which they each will incur the opportunity cost of collateral 
C. The settlement costs are summarized in Game 3, hereafter 
referred to as the collateralized credit game.
In the collateralized credit game, the equilibrium 
depends solely on the relative size of the opportunity cost of 
collateral and the cost of postponing a payment request. If
5 In 2006, the Federal Reserve eliminated the extension of free intraday credit 
to government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) and certain international 
organizations for the purpose of securities-related interest and redemption 
payments. This action was taken in part because, for some issuers, the lag 
between the time the Federal Reserve credited the interest and redemption 
payments to the recipients’ accounts (early in the morning) and the time the 
issuer covered the resulting overdraft extended, at times, until shortly before 
the close of the Fedwire system, hence exposing the Federal Reserve to credit 
risk for the duration of the day. Currently, interest and redemption payments 
have to be funded up front.
6 In models without credit risk, Freeman (1996) and Martin (2004) find that 
free intraday credit is the socially optimal policy.
the cost of delaying is greater than the cost of obtaining 
liquidity—that is,  D > C—then banks have no incentive to 
delay and the strategy profile (morning, morning) is the only 
Nash equilibrium. If Bank B plays morning, the best strategy 
for Bank A is to play morning as well. Moreover, if Bank B 
chooses to postpone, the best strategy for Bank A is still 
morning. In other words, morning is a dominating strategy 
for Bank A and, by symmetry, for Bank B as well. However, 
if the cost of liquidity is higher than the cost of delaying—
that is, C > D—then the strategy profile (afternoon, 
afternoon) is the only Nash equilibrium. It is a unique Nash 
equilibrium, since neither bank wishes to switch to morning 
if the other bank keeps playing afternoon because a switch 
would increase its settlement cost. However, it is also clear 
that the banks would be better off if they both chose to 
process payments in the morning. Unfortunately, (morning, 
morning) is not an equilibrium in this one-shot game. 
Starting from (morning, morning), each bank would wish to 
postpone payment in order to lower its settlement cost. This 
strategic situation is a classic paradigm in game theory called 
the prisoner’s dilemma.7 We summarize the results of the 
collateralized credit game in Result 2:
Result 2: In the collateralized credit game, early settlement 
(morning, morning) is a unique equilibrium if the 
opportunity cost of collateral is less than the cost of delaying 
7 The “prisoner’s dilemma” is the most famous paradigm in game theory. 
Suppose that the police have arrested two former felons who they know have 
committed an armed robbery together. Unfortunately, they lack enough 
admissible evidence to get a jury to convict them of armed robbery. They do, 
however, have enough evidence to send each prisoner away for two years for 
theft of the getaway car.
Prisoner’s Dilemma 
The chief inspector now makes the following offer to each prisoner: “If you will 
confess to the robbery, implicating your partner, and he does not also confess, 
then you’ll go free and he will get ten years. If you both confess, you’ll each get 
five years. If neither of you confesses, then you’ll each get two years for the auto 
theft.” It is a Nash equilibrium for each prisoner to confess; yet they would both 
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(C < D). This outcome is efficient. Conversely, late 
settlement (afternoon, afternoon) is a unique equilibrium 
if C > D, and the game is a prisoner’s dilemma. Late 
settlement is inefficient.
Central banks and other stakeholders in the interbank 
payments system are keenly aware that costly liquidity may lead 
to delays in processing payments or even to situations where 
the settlement of payments awaits the settlement of other 
payments. The latter situation is often referred to as gridlock, 
and the prisoner’s dilemma above is a form of gridlock. Several 
different solutions to discourage banks from holding back 
payments have been employed around the world. 
First, central banks seek to keep the opportunity cost of 
collateral low by accepting a wide range of different types 
and offering flexible arrangements for posting and using it. 
Recent examples include the European Central Bank, which 
recently expanded the pool of eligible collateral to include 
commercial loans, and the Scandinavian Cash Pool, which 
allows banks in Denmark, Norway, and Sweden to move 
collateral seamlessly across borders between the national 
RTGS systems.8
Second, some central banks and industry groups have put 
forward guidelines under which banks are to process certain 
percentages or types of traffic by predetermined times over the 
course of the business day. In the United Kingdom, members 
of the RTGS system are required to manage their payment 
flows in such a way that, on average, 50 percent of the value 
throughput is sent by noon and 75 percent is sent by 2:30 p.m. 
In Japan, banks are encouraged to return call money market 
loans within the first hour of operations.
8 See Danmarks Nationalbank (2003).
Third, central banks can use pricing. For example, the Swiss 
National Bank charges higher prices for payments sent later in 
the day, thereby giving banks a direct incentive to process early. 
Moreover, the transaction fee increases more steeply for 
payments of larger value (Chart 1).
Finally, many systems place an upper limit on the value of 
payments, forcing larger payments to be split into smaller 
payments and thereby allowing balances to be used more 
efficiently. In Fedwire, the largest payments allowed are 1 cent 
short of $10 billion. In most cases, these solutions have been 
effective in securing smooth settlement of payments. 
Nevertheless, in recent years, a number of RTGS systems 
with collateral requirements have introduced mechanisms that 
allow queued payments to be offset bilaterally or multilaterally. 
These enhancements were introduced with a view to reducing 
the amount of liquidity or collateral required for smooth 
settlement. An offsetting mechanism or gridlock resolution 
reduces the need to post collateral.
In the context of our model, an offsetting mechanism allows 
payments to be processed in a given period without the need to 
post collateral if an offsetting payment is submitted to the 
system in the same period. However, if no offsetting payments 
arrive, the system processes the payment at the end of the 
period and collateral needs to be posted. The situation where 
an offsetting mechanism is running only in the morning period 
is illustrated in Game 4. The prisoner’s dilemma changes into 
a coordination game. Coordination games are a class of games 
with multiple (pure strategy) Nash equilibria in which players 
choose the same or corresponding strategies.
If Bank A submits in the morning, then the best response of 
Bank B is to do the same; if Bank A postpones to the afternoon, 
then the best response of Bank B is, again, to do the same. 
A fundamental question in coordination games is which 
equilibrium the players will choose. In this case, it is fairly 
obvious. The game is a so-called pure coordination game, or 
game of common interest, in which both banks prefer the 
(morning, morning) equilibrium to the (afternoon, afternoon) 
equilibrium. In other words, early submission Pareto 
Game 4




morning 0, 0 2C, D
afternoon D, 2CC  +  D , C + D
Note: We underline the cost associated with the strategy that is the best 
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dominates late submission, and one would expect banks to 
choose the cost-efficient strategy. In sum, the introduction of 
a gridlock-resolution mechanism may change submission 
behavior. We offer the following conjecture:
Conjecture: Gridlock resolution and offsetting mechanisms 
may eliminate the potential prisoner’s dilemma. 
The issue of liquidity-saving mechanisms is discussed 
further in Martin and McAndrews (2008).
5. Priced Intraday Credit Regime
Under the priced credit regime, banks are charged the fee F per 
dollar if their settlement account is overdrawn at the end of a 
period. This implies that no overdraft fee is incurred if the 
banks manage to synchronize their payments. The settlement 
costs associated with the different possible pairs of strategies 
are shown in Game 5, the priced credit game.
If both banks play morning, then payments net out and 
banks incur no costs. The payments also net out if both banks 
play afternoon, but each will incur the cost of delay. If one bank 
pays and the other delays, then the paying bank will incur 
an overdraft at noon while the other can use the incoming 
payment from the morning period to fund its outgoing 
payment in the afternoon. However, the bank that delays will 
incur the cost D.
As in the collateralized credit regime, the outcome depends 
on the relative size of the cost of liquidity and the cost of 
postponing the processing of a request. Again, the strategy 
profile (morning, morning) is a unique Nash equilibrium if the 
cost of liquidity is less than the cost of delaying the payment 
request—that is, F < D.
However, if F > D, then the strategy profiles (morning, 
morning) and (afternoon, afternoon) are both Nash equilibria. To 
see this, assume that F = 5 cents and D = 2 cents, as in Game 6. 
If both banks choose to process payments early, then neither 
bank would want to change and postpone because that would 
increase its settlement cost from 0 cents to 5 cents. Likewise, 
if both banks choose to postpone, neither bank would 
unilaterally want to deviate and process because that would 
increase its settlement cost from 2 cents to 5 cents.
Here, the priced credit game has the structure of a classic 
coordination game called the stag hunt.9  The key feature 
of the stag hunt game is that while the (morning, morning) 
equilibrium is preferred by both players in terms of lowest cost, 
the other is preferred in terms of strategic risk. In the early-
settlement equilibrium, the settlement cost of one bank 
depends on the action of the other. One bank’s deviation 
from morning, for whatever reason, will impose increased 
settlement costs on the other bank. In contrast, the strategy 
to postpone payments carries no risk in the sense that the 
settlement cost is the same regardless of which action the other 
bank takes. A cautious bank may reasonably choose to 
postpone, ensuring the 2 cents with certainty rather than 
risking the cost of 5 cents. This is especially true if there are 
concerns regarding the other bank’s ability to coordinate (for 
example, because of operational risk). We recap the results of 
the priced credit game in Result 3:
Result 3: In the priced credit game, early settlement 
(morning, morning) is a unique equilibrium if the 
overdraft fee is less than the cost of delaying (F < D). The 
outcome is efficient. In contrast, both (morning, morning) 
and (afternoon, afternoon) are feasible equilibria if F > D 
and the game is a stag hunt. Late settlement is inefficient.
In the prisoner’s dilemma, there is a conflict between 
individual rationality and mutual benefit. In the stag hunt, 
rational players are pulled in one direction by consideration of 
mutual benefit and in the other by individual risk concerns 
(Skyrms 2004). In the stag hunt game, the outcome depends on 
the player’s appetite for strategic risk—that is, the uncertainty 
9 The “stag hunt” is a story that became a game. The game is a prototype of the 
social contract. The story is briefly told by the eighteenth-century philosopher 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau in A Discourse on Inequality (Skyrms 2004): “If it was a 
matter of hunting a deer, everyone well realized that he must remain faithful to 
his post; but if a hare happened to pass within reach of one of them, we cannot 







morning 0, 0 F, D
afternoon D, F  D, D
Game 6




morning 0, 0 5, 2
afternoon 2, 5 2, 2
Note: We underline the cost associated with the strategy that is the best 
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that arises from the interaction between the players of the 
game. The conflict in the priced credit game is a trade-off 
between lower settlement costs and strategic risk.
One way of pinning down a unique equilibrium is by using 
Harsanyi and Selten’s (1988) concept of risk dominance.10 In a 
symmetric 2 x 2 game, risk dominance asserts that players will 
choose the strategy that gives the highest expected payoff under 
the assumption that the opponent randomizes with equal 
probability over the two available strategies. Fixing D to be 
2 cents in Game 6 implies that (morning, morning) is the risk-
dominant equilibrium if F < 4 cents and (afternoon, afternoon) 
is the outcome if F > 4 cents. 
Result 4: In the priced credit game, the risk-dominant 
equilibrium is early settlement (morning, morning) if
F < 2D. Otherwise, late settlement (afternoon, afternoon) is 
the risk-dominant equilibrium. 
Using the analysis above, we now turn to a comparison of 
the aggregate settlement costs to the economy under 
collateralized and priced intraday credit policy regimes.
6. Choice of Intraday Credit Policy
An omnipresent question for central banks is the choice of 
intraday credit policy. For example, the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System is currently reviewing its Payment System 
Risk Policy with a view to reducing liquidity risk, credit risk, and 
operational risk while maintaining or improving payments system 
efficiency. For this reason, the Federal Reserve Board published 
a consultation paper in June 2006 to elicit information from 
financial institutions and other interested parties on their 
experiences managing intraday risk associated with Fedwire funds 
transfers. Our model can provide insight into the desirability of 
different payments system policies and highlight some of the 
difficulties facing policymakers.
Assume that a central bank is a benevolent provider of the 
RTGS system insofar as it seeks to secure the lowest possible 
aggregate settlement costs for the economy. The central bank 
can choose between a collateralized credit and a priced credit 
regime. Additionally, for the purposes of this analysis, assume 
that the central bank cannot (further) influence the cost of 
liquidity under either regime or the cost of delay. The preferred 
regime then depends on the equilibrium outcome under the 
two regimes, which in turn depends on the relative magnitudes 
of F, C, and D. 
10 In 1994, John C. Harsanyi and Reinhard Selten were awarded the Nobel Prize 
in Economics, together with John F. Nash Jr., for their pioneering analysis of 
equilibria in the theory of noncooperative games.
The aggregate settlement costs under the equilibria of the 
two intraday credit regimes are easily calculated by summing 
the entries in each cell in Game 3 and Game 5, respectively. The 
aggregate settlement costs when one bank is playing morning 
and the other afternoon are 2C + D and F + D, respectively, 
under the two regimes. With two possible (risk-dominant) 
Nash equilibria under each regime, there are four different 
scenarios to consider.
The comparative analysis is summarized in Chart 2. The X-axis 
shows the Nash equilibrium in a collateralized credit regime 
as a function of the opportunity cost of collateral. The Y-axis 
shows the risk-dominant Nash equilibrium under a priced 
credit regime as a function of the overdraft fee. In the priced 
credit regime, aggregate settlement costs are zero if the 
equilibrium is (morning, morning). In contrast, a collateralized 
credit regime always implies positive settlement costs. 
Consequently, priced credit is the preferred regime if F < 2D—
that is, in scenarios 1 and 2. In other words, take the parameters 
of the model as exogenously given.
If payments are delayed under both regimes—that is,  2D 
< F and D < C—then aggregate settlement costs are 2D + 2C 
and 2D, respectively. Hence, priced credit is the preferred 
regime C in scenario 3 in Chart 2. Conversely, collateralized 
credit is the preferred regime if banks do not delay payments 
under such a regime but they do under a priced credit 
Chart 2
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regime—that is, C < D < 2D < F (scenario 4). We summarize 
this as:
Result 5: Priced credit is preferred to collateralized credit 
except when collateralized credit leads to quicker settlement 
of payments.
The model provides very clear results in terms of the 
desirability of the two regimes, but in reality the analysis is 
more involved. Moreover, the analysis does not take into 
account default risk, against which the collateral protects. 
A challenge for comparative analysis in practice is that the cost 
of delay is not observable. In fact, little is known about the 
costs banks face if they delay settlement of payments. Without 
knowledge of the cost of delay, the comparative analysis 
becomes less informative, but the simple analysis presented in 
Chart 2 does yield the following necessary, but not a sufficient, 
condition for collateralized credit to be the preferred regime:
Result 6: For collateralized credit to be the preferred regime, 
a necessary condition is that the opportunity cost of 
collateral be lower than (literally half) the overdraft fee 
charged under priced credit.
The opportunity cost of collateral is not directly observable 
either, but the rate differential between federal funds loans, which 
are uncollateralized, and loans through repurchase agreements, 
which are collateralized, suggests that the opportunity cost is in the 
range of 12 to 15 basis points per annum (see Board of Governors 
of the Federal Reserve System [2006]).11 However, the overdraft 
fee is readily observable because it is set by the central bank with 
a view to managing credit exposure from overdrafts. Currently, 
daylight overdraft fees in the Fedwire Funds Service are calculated 
using an annual rate of 36 basis points, quoted on the basis of a 
21.5-hour day. This simple “back-of-the-envelope” comparison 
suggests that there may be scope for investigating an increased 
role for collateral in the Fedwire system. 
In the following sections, we investigate how the conclusions 
from the model are likely to change as more realism is added. We 
start by considering settlement risk, followed by incomplete 
information, repeated play, and more than two banks and periods. 
In Box 1 and Box 2, we analyze, respectively, the strategic 
interaction between banks when there is no intraday credit 
available and when banks are heterogeneous.
11 The opportunity cost of collateral would, in all likelihood, increase if the 
Federal Reserve implemented a collateralized credit regime because the 
demand for collateral would increase. 
7. Settlement Risk
Settlement risk is an important concern in all payment 
arrangements (see, for example, Kahn, McAndrews, and 
Roberds [2003] and Mills and Nesmith [2008]). Fundamentally, 
it is the risk that settlement does not take place as expected. 
As such, settlement risk comprises both liquidity and credit 
risks. Liquidity risk is the risk that a counterparty will not settle 
an obligation for full value when due, but at some unspecified 
time thereafter. Credit risk is the risk that a counterparty 
will not settle an obligation for full value either when due or 
anytime thereafter. The presence of settlement risk affects the 
strategic interaction between banks and hence their intraday 
liquidity management behavior.
To illustrate how settlement risk affects strategic 
interaction, we assume that the banks have entered into 
trades with each other yielding obligations to pay the other 
$1, to be settled gross. On settlement day, a bank might 
experience an operational incident or default altogether, 
which leads to either a temporary inability or permanent 
failure to pay. Because payment flows are symmetric, 
neither bank starts out with an exposure vis-à-vis the other 
at dawn. If a bank defaults before the opening of the RTGS 
system, the other bank can just withhold its payment. 
However, by paying early, a bank exposes itself to the 
inability or failure of the other to pay. Everything else being 
equal, one would expect banks to be more cautious in their 
behavior when facing settlement risk. In essence, settlement 
risk reduces the effective cost of delaying. 
Specifically, we model liquidity risk by assuming that, with 
probability ,  banks will not be able to submit payments to the 
RTGS system in the morning because of, say, a telecommuni-
cations outage. However, the telecommunications links to 
stricken banks are reestablished at noon and banks can then 
make payments in the afternoon period. The expected costs 
for banks are derived in the appendix. These costs are used in 
the intraday liquidity management games with liquidity risk 
shown in Game 7 and Game 8 for the two policy regimes 
(collateralized credit and priced credit). For convenience, we 
show only the costs for Bank A, but by symmetry the costs are 
the same for Bank B. 
ω
The presence of settlement risk affects the 
strategic interaction between banks and 
hence their intraday liquidity management 
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The exception proving the rule that early adopters provided 
intraday credit for free is Switzerland. The Swiss National Bank 
implemented real-time gross settlement (RTGS) systems in 1987, 
but did not provide intraday credit until the autumn of 1999. The 
change in policy was motivated by an increase in time-critical 
payments and, in particular, the future introduction of the 
Continuous Linked Settlement system for foreign exchange 
transactions. According to Heller, Nellen, and Sturm (2000), 
the amount of payments settled by noon rose from one-third 
to one-half of the daily turnover as a result.
Going against conventional wisdom, the Reserve Bank of 
New Zealand implemented a new liquidity management regime in 
2006 that discontinued its intraday automatic reverse repurchase 
facility (autorepo). Instead, the Reserve Bank chose to supply a 
significantly higher level of cash (overnight monies) sufficient to 
enable participants to settle payments efficiently. The change was 
necessitated by a growing scarcity of New Zealand government 
securities (see Reserve Bank of New Zealand [2006]).
If the central bank does not provide intraday credit, then 
payments have to be funded by balances held with the central bank, 
interbank money market borrowings, or incoming payments from 
other banks. The first two sources are costly, whereas the last is free 
from the perspective of the receiver. Let   denote the (marginal) 
opportunity cost of balances held at the central bank. The 
opportunity cost of reserves is closely linked to the central bank’s 
policy with respect to remunerating reserves. If the central bank 
does not pay interest on reserves, then the opportunity cost is close 
to the overnight money market rate, whereas if the central bank 
does pay interest on reserves, it depends on the difference between 
the money market rate and the administrative rate paid on 
reserves.
The no intraday credit game is given below for the interesting 
case where  .
ρ
ρ D >
If the opportunity cost of reserve balances is less than the cost 
of delay, then (morning, morning) is the equilibrium in dominating 
strategies. However, if the opportunity cost of reserves is larger 
than the cost of delay, the game is an anti-coordination game, so 
named because it is mutually beneficial for the players to play 
different strategies. If Bank B plays morning, then the best response 
of Bank A is to play afternoon. Conversely, if Bank B plays 
afternoon, then the best strategy for Bank A is to play morning. The 
underlying conflict in the game is that both banks want to benefit 
from free liquidity, but liquidity is rivalrous—that is, banks cannot 
benefit from it at the same time. Hence, both (morning, afternoon) 
and (afternoon, morning) are possible Nash equilibria, but neither 
Pareto dominates the other or is focal in any sense. The mixed-
strategy Nash equilibrium implies that banks play morning with 
probability   and afternoon with the complementary 
probability. The expected settlement cost for a bank is   (see 
appendix). Hence, the mixed strategy does not Pareto dominate 
either of the pure Nash equilibria, and a bank might as well play 
morning and save itself the trouble of randomizing.
It is not obvious how banks can solve the conundrum of who 
gets the benefit of free liquidity. One solution in these types of 
games is for banks to engage in pre-play communication. In pre-
play communication, each player announces the action it intends 
to take (or, alternatively, the action it would like the other to take). 
In game theory, pre-play communication that carries no cost is 
referred to as cheap talk (Farrell and Rabin 1996). Interestingly, 
in some experimental settings, cheap talk has been found to be 
effective. Another form of pre-play communication is for one bank 
to signal convincingly that it will play afternoon. One way to do 
this would be to open late, but that would probably be bad for 
business in general and thus costly.
Aumann (1974) provides a generalization of Nash equilibrium 
known as correlated equilibrium, which allows for possible 
dependencies in strategic choices. A perfectly correlated 
equilibrium would be for banks to use a fair coin to determine 
which bank gets to play afternoon. In a repeated setting, a 
convention for banks to alternate sending early could conceivably 
evolve.
Above and beyond the potential instability of the equilibrium 
outcome, a key insight of the no intraday liquidity management 
game is that the monetary policy stance may directly affect the 
settlement of payments intraday owing to the close link between 
the opportunity cost of holding reserves and the overnight interest 
rate. Any movement in the monetary policy stance will affect the 
opportunity cost and may shift the equilibrium around. 
Interestingly, Heller, Nellen, and Sturm (2000) claim that a less 
restrictive monetary policy stance from 1993 to 1999 can explain a 
large part of the reduced congestion observed in Swiss Interbank 
Clearing, as this led banks to hold increased account balances.
pD ρ ⁄ =
ρ
Box 1
The No Intraday Credit Game




morning  ,     , D
afternoon D,   D +  , D +  
Note: We underline the cost associated with the strategy that is the 
best response of a bank given the strategy played by the other.16 A Tale of Games Banks Play
In the analysis, we focus on the interaction between two identical 
banks. Obviously, participants in a real-time gross settlement 
system are not a homogenous group. Here, we explore the 
implications of introducing heterogeneity among participants. For 
ease of exposition, we consider only two cases. First, we look at the 
case where participants face different liquidity and delay costs. We 
do this in the context of a recent policy change in the Fedwire 
system. Second, we consider the case where payment flows are not 
balanced and then we try to gauge the extent to which that affects 
the strategic interaction between banks.
In 2006, the Federal Reserve eliminated the extension of free 
intraday credit to government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) and 
certain international organizations for the purpose of securities-
related principal and interest payments. This action was taken in part 
because, for some issuers, the lag between the time the Federal 
Reserve credited the interest and redemption payments to the 
recipients’ accounts (early in the morning) and the time the issuer 
covered the resulting overdraft extended, at times, until shortly 
before the close of the Fedwire system. As a result, the Federal 
Reserve was exposed to credit risk for the duration of the day. 
Currently, principal and interest payments have to be funded up 
front.
To see how the simple framework can account for this 
observation, assume that one player is now an issuer of securities 
and needs to pay $1 in principal and interest to the other player—
a bank. Assume that issuer had the necessary cash to pay out 
principal and interest on hand the previous day and chose to lend 
it out in the overnight money market to earn a return. For 
simplicity, also assume that the borrower was the bank that 
henceforth has to return the $1 plus interest   to the issuer.
The central bank is granting free intraday credit to the issuer 
but charges the bank for overdrafts. Owing to market conventions, 
the cost of delaying the payout of principal and interest is high (H), 
whereas the cost of delaying the return of a money market loan to 
a participant that has access to free intraday credit is virtually nil. 
The resulting principal and interest game is shown below.
ρ ()
Clearly, it is a dominating strategy for the issuer to pay out 
early. If the issuer plays morning, then the bank is indifferent 
between returning early or late. However, returning the overnight 
loan late is a weakly dominating strategy because if the issuer for 
some reason should delay then it would be best for the bank to 
delay as well. A small intraday opportunity cost for a bank using 
overdraft capacity to cover the interest on the loan would eliminate 
the (morning, morning) equilibrium. The (morning, afternoon) 
equilibrium leaves the issuer with an overdraft at the central bank 
for the entire day. In sum, different cost structures for participants 
can lead to interesting games with asymmetric equilibria. We now 
turn to payment flow imbalances.
On any given day, payment flows are never balanced because 
banks receive different amounts of payment requests from their 
customers. Banks manage their projected end-of-day balances 
throughout the day. Liquidity is redistributed via the interbank 
money market from the “haves” to the “have nots.” The question 
is the extent to which such differences in payment flows can affect 
the strategic interaction among banks. To provide insight, we 
assume that Bank B has two $1 payments to send to Bank A 
whereas Bank A still has only $1 to send to Bank B. The strategy set 
expands for Bank B, which can choose to send them both early, 
delay them both, or send one early while holding back the other. 
The resulting games are shown below.
The games become slightly more complicated, but the 
fundamental issues remain. In the case of collateralized credit, 
banks may still end up delaying payments even though it is more 
efficient to process early in terms of minimizing aggregate 
settlement cost. In the case of priced credit, it is possible only to 
offset two payments against each other, and thus it turns out that 
Bank B will always hold back one payment. The stag hunt is played 
with the remaining payment.
Box 2
Heterogeneity




morning  F, 0 (1+  )F, H  
afternoon  F, 0  F, H
Note: We underline the cost associated with the strategy that is the 
best response of a bank given the strategy played by the other.
Collateralized Credit Game with Payment Flow
Imbalance (C > D )




mC ,   3CC ,  D + 2C 2C, 2D+C
aD , 4CD , D+3CD + C ,2D+2C
Note: We underline the cost associated with the strategy that is the 
best response of a bank given the strategy played by the other.
Priced Credit Game with Payment Flow
Imbalance ( F > D )




m 0, 2F 0, D+F F, F+2D
aD ,   3FD ,  D + 2FD , 2D+F
Note: We underline the cost associated with the strategy that is the 
best response of a bank given the strategy played by the other.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / September 2008 17
Exhibit 1
Equilibrium and Efficiency in the Collateralized
Credit Game with Liquidity Risk
D D
(a, a)( a, a)( m,m)
efficient prisoner’s dilemma efficient
C C
1-  1- 
 
Exhibit 2
Equilibrium and Efficiency in the Priced Credit Game
with Liquidity Risk
D
(a, a)( m,m), (a, a)( m,m)
efficient stag hunt efficient
F F  
The introduction of liquidity risk implies that a bank risks 
incurring the cost of delay even if it is playing the morning strategy. 
On the flip side, the other bank incurs additional liquidity costs 
due to the lack of an incoming payment. As such, liquidity risk 
affects both the equilibrium outcomes and the efficiency thereof. 
In a collateralized credit regime, the (afternoon, afternoon) 
equilibrium becomes more likely (Exhibit 1). 
Without liquidity risk, the condition for late settlement is 
D < C, whereas with liquidity risk it is D < C/(1- ). Increasing 
the exposure to liquidity risk—that is,  — raises the 
likelihood that banks hold back payments as  . 
Interestingly, holding back payments is the efficient outcome if 
the cost of delay is sufficiently low or the risk of a temporary 
failure to pay is high. The prisoner’s dilemma disappears if 
.
With priced credit, banks will still play (morning, morning) 
if the cost of liquidity is less than the cost of delay; and if D 
drops below F, the stag hunt emerges, as in Result 3 (Exhibit 2). 
However, (afternoon, afternoon) is now a feasible unique Nash 
equilibrium. This equilibrium is efficient and will be the 
outcome if the exposure to liquidity risk is sufficiently high—
that is,  . 
To model credit risk, we assume that a bank with probability  
 will be closed by its regulator at noon. Should that occur, the 
ω
ω 1 →
C 1 ω – () ∞ → ⁄
D ωC 1 ω – () ⁄ <
ω DF ⁄ >
δ
bank will not be making any further payments. Thus, the other 
bank has to borrow from the discount window at rate R in 
order to square its account at the end of the day. Furthermore, 
assume that a surviving bank eventually will recover   of 
the dollars that it is owed. Hence, the total cost of default is  
.
We assume that if a bank defaults then there is no reputation 
cost of delaying. Hence, the expected cost of delay is . 
The resulting games for the collateralized and priced credit 
regimes are shown in Game 9 and Game 10, respectively. 
Again, the settlement costs are derived in the appendix, and 
only the expected settlement costs for Bank A are shown.
For collateralized credit, it turns out that the results are 
identical to those for liquidity risk. The only difference is that 
the probability of a default,  , replaces the probability of a 
temporary failure to pay,  , in Exhibit 1. With priced credit, 
banks will play the (morning, morning) equilibrium whenever 
 compared with D > F, when there is no risk of 
default, as in Result 3. Otherwise, the game is a stag hunt. We 
sum up the results from introducing settlement risk as:
Result 7: Settlement risk makes (other things being equal) 
late settlement (afternoon, afternoon) a more likely 
outcome of the intraday liquidity management game. 
Late settlement may be efficient.
1 α – ()
θαR + =
1 δ – () D
δ
ω
DF δθ + >
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efficient prisoner’s dilemma inefficient
(1-p) C C
8. Incomplete Information 
The analysis so far has assumed that banks have complete 
information with regard to the payments to be settled. In 
reality, banks have only an incomplete picture during the day. 
In fact, there can be substantial uncertainty about both 
incoming payments and requests that customers will submit 
over the remainder of the day. This ambiguity further 
complicates the task of managing the liquidity position of a 
bank within the day.
Bech and Garratt (2003) develop a Bayesian game in which 
banks have private knowledge about their own pending 
payment requests but only imperfect information about those 
of the opponent. Moreover, banks face uncertainty 
(fundamental) about the arrival of new payment requests and 
uncertainty (strategic) in terms of the opponent’s action. In the 
model, payment requests arrive from customers at dawn and 
at noon with probabilities p and q, respectively. Banks seek to 
minimize expected settlement costs. It turns out that the 
strategies of banks are determined by the action they take when 
they do receive a request at dawn. This simplifies the analysis 
and allows us to stay within a 2 x 2 framework for the purposes 
of determining equilibria. We construct games where the 
payoffs are conditional on having received a request from the 
perspective of each bank. For example, the expected settlement 
costs of sending early against an opponent that also sends early 
(if it has a request) are C + (1–p)C and (1–p)F, respectively. The 
extra component relative to collateralized and priced credit 
games described earlier reflects the chance that the opponent 
might not have received a request and hence the bank would 
have to borrow additional liquidity from the central bank. The 
outcomes under the two intraday credit regimes—now Bayes-
Nash equilibria—are determined by Game 11 and Game 12, 
respectively. However, the full Bayesian game is needed to 
evaluate the efficiency implications of different strategy profiles 
as banks individually do not take into account the positive 
externality of liquidity to the other bank. We cite the results on 
efficiency here and refer the reader to the original paper (Bech 
and Garratt 2003) for the details. 
In the case of collateralized credit, it is still true that 
(morning, morning) is the Nash equilibrium whenever D > C 
because the additional cost of (1-p)C is incurred regardless of 
whether the bank in question is playing morning or afternoon. 
Otherwise (afternoon, afternoon) is the equilibrium (Exhibit 3). 
While Game 11 is only a prisoner’s dilemma when the 
additional cost of delaying is larger than the expected cost of 
processing the payment—that is, (1–p)C < D < C —it is still 
inefficient, from an aggregate expected settlement cost 
perspective, to delay. Early settlement is the only efficient 
outcome. 
In the case of priced credit, (morning, morning) is again the 
equilibrium whenever D > F. Conversely, if D < (1 - p)F, then 
the strategy profile (afternoon, afternoon) is the Bayes-Nash 
equilibrium (Exhibit 4). In the intermediate case, the stag hunt 
emerges once again. In contrast to the case of collateralized 
credit, it is possible for postponement of payments to be 
efficient in the case of priced credit. This occurs if D < (1-p)qF 
—that is, if the cost of delay is low (relative to the overdraft fee) 
and the arrival of payment requests is sufficiently skewed 
toward the afternoon (low p and high q). In that case, the 
expected benefit from being able to offset payments in the 
afternoon outweighs the cost of delay. 
We reiterate the outcome of introducing incomplete 
information and random arrivals of payment requests in the 
following result:
Result 8: Incomplete information about payment flows 
increases (other things being equal) the likelihood of late 
settlement (afternoon, afternoon). In the case of priced 
credit, late-day requests may make late settlement efficient.
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9. Repeated Interaction
In most payments systems, participating banks interact 
repeatedly with each other, both within and across days. It is 
well known that playing the same game (such as the prisoner’s 
dilemma) numerous times might yield a different outcome. 
Unlike a game played once, a repeated game allows for a 
strategy to be contingent on past moves, thus allowing for 
reputation effects and retribution. The key is that cooperation 
now can be rewarded by cooperation later, and cheating can 
be punished by not cooperating later. It is thus not always wise 
to pursue a short-run gain in a repeated game. 
A trigger strategy in which cheating is punished in 
subsequent periods can encourage cooperation. One harsh 
example is for a player to begin by cooperating in the first 
period and to continue cooperating until a single defection by 
the opponent, after which the player never cooperates again. 
A less harsh trigger strategy is “tit for tat,” where a player 
responds in one period with the same action the opponent used 
in the last period. The repetition of a game may solve some of 
the single-play issues discussed above. However, by offering 
more complex strategies, a repeated game can also result in 
more equilibrium outcomes. In other words, the repetition of 
a game itself does not necessarily solve the quandaries faced 
by players in single-play games. Additional structure is often 
needed. 
Here, we assume an infinite play setting where banks 
discount the future. The daily discount factor is given by 
. Banks can choose between two possible strategies. 
One strategy is to always delay. The other is a trigger strategy 
whereby a bank will send early as long as the other does, but will 
delay afterward if the other bank deviates. Using the formula 
for infinite geometric series, we can compute the future 
discounted settlement cost under the two strategies for each of 
the two intraday credit regimes. For example, in a collateralized 
credit regime where both banks are playing trigger, the future 
discounted settlement costs are: 
,
0 β 1 <<
c
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where t denotes the trigger strategy and bank  . In the 
case of priced credit, the future discounted settlement costs for 
a bank playing trigger strategy against an opponent that always 
delays are the overdraft fee in the first period and then the cost 
of delay for any subsequent days in which they interact. That is: 
,
where a denotes the “always delay” strategy. The settlement 
cost for the remaining strategy profiles can be derived in a 
similar fashion. The resulting games are shown in Game 13 and 
Game 14, respectively. We show only the discounted future 
settlement cost for Bank A. The prisoner’s dilemma remains in 
the collateralized credit regime if the future matters little to 
banks, as illustrated in Exhibit 5. In fact, with   , we get the 
one-stage collateralized credit game described earlier. However, if 
the discount factor is significantly large—that is,   —
then repeated play transforms the prisoner’s dilemma into a stag 
hunt. Moreover, as shown in the appendix, if the discount 
factor is even higher—that is,   —then 
the risk-dominant equilibrium is (trigger, trigger). 
In the case of priced credit, the infinitely repeated version 
of the game remains a stag hunt game if F > D. However, 
early processing is the risk-dominant equilibrium if  
 compared with F < 2D in the one-stage 
game (see appendix). Hence, the more the future matters for 
banks, the more likely it becomes that banks will coordinate 
toward early processing. We summarize the results of 
introducing repeated play in Result 9:
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Exhibit 4
Equilibrium and Efficiency in the Bayesian
Collateralized Credit Game
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Result 9: In a repeated game setting with a trigger strategy, 
the prisoner’s dilemma in the case of collateralized credit 
may turn into a stag hunt if the discount factor is sufficiently 
high. In the priced credit regime, the stag hunt game remains 
a stag hunt. Under both regimes, the likelihood of early 
processing is increasing in the value placed on future costs. 
10. More Players
The number of participants in RTGS systems around the world 
varies significantly. In the United Kingdom, the CHAPS 
Sterling system has fifteen direct participants, whereas the 
Federal Reserve’s Fedwire Funds Service has more than 7,000. 
Obviously, our two-player framework is a simplification of 
reality. Adding additional banks to the mix increases the 
dimensionality of the game. With three banks each having a 
dollar to send to one another, the number of different strategy 
profiles increases from four to sixty-four as banks now can 
delay to one bank while sending early to the other. With four 
banks, the same number is 4,096. 
Here, we focus on the three-player game, where each bank 
has a dollar to send to the other two banks. The settlement costs 
of Bank  {A, B, C}, given its own strategy and the number of 
other banks sending payments early to the bank in question, 
are shown in Game 15 and Game 16, respectively. 
In the collateralized credit game, it is still a dominating 
strategy to delay. Hence, ((a, a), (a, a), (a, a)) is a unique 
equilibrium, but the outcome is inefficient. In the priced credit 
game, the best response of Bank i is to do the same if the two 
opponents either send or delay all their payments. If one bank 
is playing morning and the other is playing afternoon, then it is 
the best response of Bank i also to send one early and delay the 
other. However, such strategy profiles are only equilibria if the 
payment flow somehow miraculously forms a cycle—for 
example, Bank A sends to Bank B, which sends to Bank C, 
which sends to Bank A. In other words, the underlying 
i ∈
payment flows become intertwined with the strategic 
interaction. Understanding the network structure of payment 
flows is important when analyzing behavior in interbank 
payments systems (see, for example, Soramäki et al. [2007] 
and Bech and Garratt [2006]). We summarize the effects of 
expanding the number of players as:
Result 10: Adding more players does not fundamentally 
change the strategic interaction of the intraday liquidity 
management game. 
11. More Actions
A trend among RTGS systems has been to extend operating hours. 
Since 2001, the Fedwire Funds Service has opened at 9:00 p.m. ET 
on the preceding calendar day and closed at 6:30 p.m. ET.12 In 
comparison, the Swiss Interbank Payment system opens at 
5:00 p.m. on the preceding calendar day and closes at 4:15 p.m., 
thus approaching around-the-clock processing. This trend, 
coupled with the fact that RTGS systems operate in continuous 
12 For example, on a Sunday, the Fedwire Funds Service will open at 9:00 p.m. 
ET with a cycle date of Monday, although transfers sent from 9:00 p.m. to 
midnight ET on Sunday will settle in real time on Sunday.
Game 15
Three-Player Game with Collateralized Credit
(  C > D)




(m,m) 4C 3C 2C
(m,a) or (a,m) 3C+D 2C+D C+D
(a,a) 2C+2D 2D+C 2D
Note: We underline the cost associated with the strategy that is the best 
response of a bank given the strategy played by the other.
Game 16
Three-Player Game with Priced Credit
( F > D)





(m,a) or (a,m) D+F D D
(a,a) 2D 2D 2D
Note: We underline the cost associated with the strategy that is the best 
response of a bank given the strategy played by the other.
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time, suggests that a model with only a morning and an 
afternoon period is perhaps too coarse a representation. 
As a first step, we extend our model with an extra period 
denoted evening. In the case of collateralized credit, the prisoner’s 
dilemma remains if the opportunity cost of collateral is larger than 
the cost of delay. Banks end up playing (evening, evening), even 
though it would be better for them to play either (morning, 
morning) or (afternoon, afternoon), as shown in Game 17.
In the case of priced credit, adding an extra period yields the 
game shown in Game 18. The game remains a coordination game 
if the cost of liquidity is larger than the cost of delay. The strategy 
profile (evening, evening) is now an additional feasible Nash 
equilibrium. As the number of periods increases, it might become 
increasingly difficult for banks to coordinate. In such cases, focal 
points (often referred to as Schelling points), which are solutions 
that for some reason seem natural or special, may offer guidance 
in terms of equilibrium selection.13As discussed by McAndrews 
and Rajan (2000), focal points may, in the context of RTGS 
13 Thomas C. Schelling was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2005 
“for having enhanced our understanding of conflict and cooperation through 
game-theory analysis.” One contribution was the notion of focal points. 
Schelling found that coordinative solutions—which he called focal points—
could be arrived at more often than predicted by theory. The ability to 
coordinate appears to be related to the parties’ common frames of reference. 
Social conventions and norms are integral parts of this common ground (see 
<http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/>).
systems, include times at which ancillary payments or securities 
settlement systems settle their final positions. 
Result 11: Expanding the number of periods within the day 
does not fundamentally change the strategic interaction of 
the intraday liquidity management game, but it does make 
equilibrium selection more difficult.
12. Conclusion
This article presents a simple game-theoretical framework that 
can be used to address both positive and normative economic 
questions associated with intraday liquidity management. The 
simplicity of the framework is both its strength and its 
weakness. The strength is that it clearly exposes the 
fundamental trade-offs associated with strategic interaction in 
an RTGS environment. However, the extensions discussed 
highlight the complexity faced by banks in managing intraday 
liquidity, the challenges faced by policymakers, and 
consequently the difficulty in devising an all-encompassing 
framework. Nonetheless, our analysis shows the commonality 
of issues faced by all stakeholders in the world’s interbank 
payments systems. 
The ongoing relevance of the issues discussed in this article 
is exemplified by the Federal Reserve Board’s February 28, 
2008, request for public comments on proposed changes to its 
Payments System Risk policy that are intended to loosen 
intraday liquidity constraints and reduce operational risks in 
financial markets and the payments system.14 The Board is 
proposing a new strategy for providing intraday credit to 
depository institutions and would encourage these institutions 
to collateralize their daylight overdrafts. Specifically, the Board 
proposes to adopt a policy of supplying intraday balances to 
depository institutions predominantly through voluntarily 
collateralized daylight overdrafts.  The proposed policy would 
encourage the voluntary pledging of collateral to cover daylight 
overdrafts by providing collateralized daylight overdrafts at a 
zero fee and by raising the fee for uncollateralized daylight 
overdrafts to 50 basis points (annual rate) from the current 36 
basis points. The Board expects that a revised Payments System 
Risk policy could be implemented approximately two years 





Collateralized Credit Game with Three Periods




mC ,  C 2C, D 3C, 2D
aD , 2CC + D ,  C + DD + 2C, 2D
e 2D, 3C 2D, D+2C 2D+C, 2D+C
Note: We underline the cost associated with the strategy that is the best 
response of a bank given the strategy played by the other.
Game 18
Priced Credit Game with Three Periods




m 0, 0 F, D 2F, 2D
aD ,  F D , D F + D, 2D
e 2D, 2F 2D, F + D 2D, 2D
Note: We underline the cost associated with the strategy that is the best 
response of a bank given the strategy played by the other.22 A Tale of Games Banks Play
Appendix
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When is it better to play “always delay” given that the opponent 
plays “trigger”?
 
When is it better to play “always delay” given that the opponent 
also plays “always delay”? 
When is (trigger, trigger) the risk-dominant equilibrium?
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